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INTRODUCTION: THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF CARIBBEAN 
DECOLONIZA TION 
Two centuries after the Haitian revolution the decolonization of the Caribbean still 
seems incomplete; nor is this situation likely to change in the near future. Of the four 
major European colonizers, only Spain has been forced to retreat from the region. 
With Puerto Rico (3.8 million people) and the US Virgin Islands (110000), the USA 
has the largest share of the population in the non-sovereign Caribbean, followed by 
France with its departements d'outre-mer (DOM, roughly 1 million), The Nether-
lands with the Netherlands Antilles (180000) and Aruba (90000), and the UK with 
its overseas territories (155000). In all, some 15% of the 37 million people living in 
the Caribbean today reside in non-sovereign territories. 
Any analysis of political and development issues in the Caribbean must take stock 
of the fact that the region in itself is small, and that most Caribbean territories are 
too. Small islands need not necessarily suffer from their scale - some analysts point at 
advantages such as flexibility which come with smallness. Yet the odds are against 
small states when it comes to political clout. They are "mostly acted upon by much 
more powerful states and institutions ... For all that, it is vulnerabilities rather than 
opportunities ... that come through as the most striking manifestations of the 
consequences of smallness in global politics" (Payne, 2004, p. 634). 
Another dimension of crucial importance in the Caribbean context is constitutional 
status. Sovereignty is a mixed economic blessing for micro-states generally. Even if 
sovereign micro-states may prove to be remarkably viable, non-sovereign territories 
world-wide definitely score better by economic standards (Armstrong et aI., 1998; 
Armstrong and Read, 2000). The Caribbean does not present an exception to this 
rule, as recently documented in a thorough analysis of both Caribbean and Pacific 
island economies, including their demographic characteristics (McElroy and Sanborn, 
2005), and of the Caribbean only (McElroy and de Albuquerque, 1995). In the 
Caribbean, which contains an extremely heterogeneous collection of both real and 
virtual islands, l there is an evident positive correlation between non-sovereignty and 
standards of living (as measured by conventional economic variables), and to some 
degree between non-sovereignty and good governance, including guarantees of 
human rights and liberties (Oostindie and Klinkers, 2003, passim). 
This observation certainly applies if the three major countries of the Caribbean are 
included in the equation. Cuba (11.3 million), Haiti (8.3 million) and the Dominican 
Republic (8.6 million) together account for three-quarters of the total Caribbean 
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population. These three states, giants by Caribbean standards yet still small by 
international criteria, boast a history of sovereignty dating back one (Cuba) to two 
(Haiti) centuries. At the close of the twentieth century Haiti was the poorest country 
in the Caribbean. In a list of 28 entities, the Dominican Republic was in twenty-third 
position, and Cuba twenty-fifth, in GNP per capita (Bulmer-Thomas, 2001; Oostindie 
and Klinkers, 2003, pp. 154-155). Caribbean evidence thus suggests that sovereignty 
is a drawback for economic development, not only for the young micro-states of the 
region, but even for the largest states with a history of independence dating back one 
to two centuries. 
When the 'big three' are excluded from the equation, one is left with four formal 
colonial subdivisions within the Caribbean region. Most of the former British West 
Indian colonies attained their sovereignty between 1962 (Jamaica) and 1983 (St Kitts 
and Nevis). Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands have remained attached to the 
USA. The French colonies were fully integrated into the French state in 1946 as 
departements d'outre-mer (DOM). The former Dutch colony of Suriname became an 
independent republic in 1975, whereas the six Dutch islands in the Caribbean are still 
part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. 
Glossing over the intermediate states of Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Haiti, 
we may observe that all the remaining Caribbean territories are small or even tiny by 
international standards. Puerto Rico has a population of 3.9 million, Jamaica 2.7 
million, Trinidad and Tobago 1.1 million. All others are below the one million mark. 
At the extreme end we find independent nations such as St Lucia with 166000 people, 
St Vincent and the Grenadines with 118 000, and St Kitts and Nevis with only 47000 
people. With the exception of Puerto Rico, the non-sovereign islands all belong to the 
category of the smallest Caribbean territories. 
What is the situation of the postwar sovereign states compared to those that opted 
to retain some sort of constitutional and 'neocolonial' attachment to their metropolis? 
It is difficult to offer any hard evidence of a direct causality, but it is obvious that most 
of the non-sovereign entities are better off in terms of per capita incomes, assuming, 
that is, that no significant contrasts in overall distribution of income exist (Bulmer-
Thomas, 2001; Oostindie and Klinkers, 2003, pp. 154-155). Out of the 10 richest 
entities in the Caribbean in the late twentieth century, nine are non-sovereign. Out of 
these 10, only the Bahamas is an independent state. Even when the big three are 
excluded, the 10 poorest countries include only one non-sovereign island, the tiny UK 
overseas territory of Montserrat, beleaguered by quite unique environmental hazards. 
A particularly painful contrast is provided by the three Guyanas. The former British 
colony of Guyana and the former Dutch colony of Suriname are among the three 
poorest states of the Caribbean, whereas the French department of Guyane is among 
the richest. Another indication of the costs of independence is suggested by the 
divergent development within the former Dutch Caribbean. Suriname has experi-
enced a continuous deterioration since independence, whereas the Dutch islands, with 
some significant contrasts between them, have maintained their position within the 
category of the privileged. 
For present purposes we need not discuss at any length the variables explaining the 
better economic performance and higher standards of living of non-sovereign islands. 
Certainly, direct metropolitan monetary transfers are not the only or necessarily the 
most important factor. Being embedded in a larger and generally stable constitutional 
entity serves to strengthen these dependent territories' institutional environment, with 
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ensuing positive effects for local business and governments and enhanced credibility 
for international finance. Then there is the major advantage of duty-free or 
preferential access to metropolitan markets. And, of course, the virtual guarantee 
that in extreme cases - particularly when natural disasters such as hurricanes wreak 
havoc - there will be immediate and relatively generous metropolitan disaster relief. 
What of the functioning of democracy and particularly guarantees of human rights 
and liberties? The first and perhaps most important conclusion to be drawn is that the 
record of the Commonwealth Caribbean has been remarkably positive, in spite of 
enormous economic problems compounded by the ever more evident threats provided 
by international crime. This is a major accomplishment. Yet the small number of 
countries which have suffered serious disruptions in their postwar democratic 
development - Guyana, Grenada and Suriname; some would argue that Jamaica 
under Michael Manley's early socialist experiment should be added to this list - are 
all young independent states. Independent and non-sovereign states alike have 
experienced serious problems with the quality of governance, but no suspension of 
democratic institutions was ever enforced or seriously considered among the latter. In 
these dependent territories standards of governance are defined and if necessary 
enforced, by the metropolis. 
The same metropolis also guarantees the territorial integrity of the non-sovereign 
unit. This may seem to be a hypothetical benefit, inasmuch as intra-regional warfare 
seems a phenomenon of the distant past in the Caribbean. Yet there have been some 
such threats in the postwar Caribbean, for example incidental Venezuelan claims 
against Trinidad and Tobago and the Netherlands Antilles, Guatemalan claims 
against Belize, and Guyanese - Surinamese skirmishes. So this potential benefit of 
being under the protection of a larger and more powerful external state cannot be 
dismissed and is indeed appreciated (e.g. Oostindie and Verton, 1998, pp. 54-55). 
There is another major benefit to non-sovereignty. Migration to the USA and 
Canada has become a crucial strategy of survival for millions of people from the 
sovereign Caribbean. Potential migrants have to endure difficult, lengthy, often 
humiliating, and not always successful procedures to gain admittance, the right of 
abode, and eventually citizenship. None of this applies to the citizens of the non-
sovereign Caribbean when they seek to migrate to their metropolis. (One significant 
but temporary exception to this was the restrictive British Dependent Territories 
Citizenship, from 1981 to 2002.) Even if per capita incomes are high in these 
territories by sovereign Caribbean standards, they clearly fall short of metropolitan 
standards of living. This, in addition to other pull factors such as educational 
opportunities, or the broadening of one's horizon, has persuaded large numbers in the 
non-sovereign Caribbean to move to their respective metropolis. They do not 
encounter major legal obstacles because they have metropolitan citizenship and thus 
the right of abode in the metropolis. 
Thus, in at least three dimensions - per capita income, the protection of the 
citizenry against external or internal threats (particularly the functioning of a 
representative democracy and guarantees of civil rights and liberties) and with regard 
to migration - there are evident benefits to non-sovereignty. Yet there are also some 
disadvantages. Metropolitan protectionism and the frequently massive accompanying 
financial transfers may have boosted per capita income, but they have also served to 
create uncompetitive consumer economies and, particularly for Puerto Rico and the 
French DOMs, 'aid addiction'. Likewise, the easy migration outlet may have reduced 
124 G. Oostindie 
population pressure in these densely inhabited islands, but at the same time may have 
caused a brain drain and an almost exclusive orientation towards the metropolis, one 
which serves to further isolate the islands from their Caribbean surroundings. 
Finally, there is a fourth dimension: the ideological and psychological significance 
of the sheltered constitutional status of non-sovereignty. This is perhaps a moot point. 
The rhetoric of political nationalism invariably starts with the axiom that ending 
colonial hegemony is a prerequisite for 'real' national development. It is striking how 
in non-sovereign territories many politicians firmly opposed to independence still pay 
lip-service to the presumed ultimate objective of becoming an independent state. As a 
former Antillean prime minister once confided: "It is your pride, your dignity!" Such 
convictions, however, do not reorient the past or present actual performances by the 
political elite. 
For all practical purposes politicians in the non-sovereign Caribbean aspire to 
maintain the many material advantages of the postcolonial bond, while at the same 
time securing maximum autonomy. This is a recipe for at times heated contestations 
over the thin dividing line between outside control and internal authority. Such 
contestations tend to occur not only in strictly administrative and political terms, but 
equally as an issue of a besieged national identity. All this becomes evident time and 
again, whether in Puerto Rico, Martinique, Cura\=ao or Montserrat. The enormous 
asymmetry inherent in metropolitan - (post)colonial relations is a permanent 
frustration on the Caribbean side, a frustration often experienced as a minor irritant 
in the metropolitan centres of power. This is not only a problem felt by local 
administrators. Certainly in the Caribbean context there is a wider collective 
ambivalence towards, if not outright distrust of, the metropolis. After all, the 
metropolis may be useful and accommodating today, but it started out in the region 
as a crass colonial power populating its plantation colonies with African slaves and 
Asian indentured labourers. Their descendants are as keenly aware of this historical 
background as of the fact that the metropolitan appreciation of said background is 
usually very limited. 
It is obvious that there is no way - or need for that matter - to establish objectively 
which dimension or which combination of the four dimensions outlined above should 
be rated as decisive in assessing the costs and benefits of independence. The different 
actors in this postcolonial double bind - Caribbean governments and their individual 
citizens, Caribbean citizens as potential migrants and metropolitan governments -
have widely divergent perspectives and interests. There is therefore no foregone 
conclusion, but there is one hard empirical fact: the overwhelming majorities within 
the non-sovereign Caribbean do not want to consider any change of status which 
would endanger the obvious advantages of their postcolonial dependency. Plebiscites, 
opinion polls and electoral processes have demonstrated time and again that the 
overwhelming majority of citizens in the non-sovereign Caribbean islands, and in the 
one continental territory, French Guyana, are adamantly opposed to a move towards 
full independence. The option of full independence for small territories remains 
widely resisted (Oostindie and Verton, 1998; Oostindie and Klinkers, 2003, pp. 220-
221; Baldacchino, 2004). 
Meanwhile the political legitimacy of the choice against independence, both for the 
Caribbean and world-wide, has become stronger over the years. The United Nations 
affirmed as early as 1960, and again in 1970, that any status including free 
association or integration within the metropolis was acceptable as long as this option 
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was freely chosen by a former colony's citizenry (Oostindie and Klinkers, 2001, Vol. 
I, pp. 131-132; Vol. III, p. 77). The growing empirical evidence of the high costs of 
sovereignty for young micro-states provided additional argumentation. Indeed, as 
McElroy and Sanborn conclude for both Caribbean and Pacific islands, there is 
abundant "scientific basis for their [non-sovereign islands'] persistent choice to retain 
metropolitan linkages and the favourable benefits of the political economy of 
dependence" (McElroy and Sanborn, 2005, p. 10). Indeed, the findings of this 
scholarly work firmly coincide with common Caribbean sense! 
This chapter will now review and analyse the past decolonization process of the 
Dutch Caribbean - initially comprising Suriname and the six-island Netherlands 
Antilles - and consider recent developments in the light of the dynamic relationship 
between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and its remaining Caribbean territories. A 
short conclusion will reflect on the wider relevance of this particular case. 
THE FIRST PHASE OF DUTCH DECOLONIZATION: TOWARDS THE 1954 
STATUUT 
The core of Dutch colonialism was not situated in the Caribbean but rather in the 
Dutch East Indies. Here classic colonialism - based on economic and geopolitical 
interests combined with administrative zeal - was abruptly ended through a classical 
decolonization struggle characterized by bloody battles and protracted negotiations 
which would poison postcolonial relations. In only seven years - marked by the 
Japanese occupation in 1942, the unilateral proclamation of independence in 1945 
and the transfer of sovereignty in 1949 - the Netherlands lost the Dutch East Indies, a 
colony which was, many thought, a mixed metaphor: both the cork which kept the 
Dutch economy floating, and the Dutch ticket to the status of player in world politics. 
At the end of the day the loss of Indonesia would turn out to be no economic drama 
but it did reduce the significance of the Netherlands in international politics. 
Concurrently with this arduous process, The Hague developed a de co Ionization 
policy for its Caribbean colonies. The outcome was the Statuut or Charter of the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands, proclaimed in 1954. The Statuut defined the Kingdom 
as a voluntary relationship between three equal and internally autonomous countries, 
being the Netherlands, Suriname and the six Caribbean islands forming the 
Netherlands Antilles. A middle path had been chosen between the two extremes -
full sovereignty for the former Caribbean colonies or, conversely, complete 
integration in the metropolis as provinces - neither of which was seriously discussed 
by any of the partners involved. 
As stated in the preamble of the Statuut, the three countries would "take care of 
their own interests autonomously, manage communal affairs on an equal footing, and 
accord each other assistance". The Charter defined foreign policy, defence, 
citizenship, and the safeguarding of proper governmental administration as matters 
of common interest to be governed by the Kingdom of the Netherlands. This 
Kingdom government was simply delineated as the ruling Dutch cabinet, expanded to 
include one plenipotentiary minister for each of the two Caribbean territories. The 
initial concept to inaugurate a Kingdom parliament to which this Kingdom 
government would be accountable was eventually abandoned by all parties. At one 
point in the long-winded negotiations all parties agreed that this would be too 
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complicated a structure, and too much of a drain on the limited Caribbean political 
and administrative resources. For pragmatic reasons the simpler variation was 
chosen, which up until today reflects the 'democratic deficit' of a government without 
a corresponding parliament. 
The Statuut rests on notions of 'equality' and 'reciprocal assistance', which, 
because of the asymmetrical balance of power, are totally fictitious. That was already 
obvious in 1954. The initial formulae were actually not invented with an eye to 
Caribbean decolonization but, rather, to World War II conditions, where the exiled 
Dutch cabinet in London hoped to persuade the Indonesian nationalists to remain 
within a modernized postwar Kingdom of the Netherlands. There is a double irony 
here if we take the demographics into consideration. In 1940 the Netherlands had 
about nine million inhabitants, while Indonesia had 70 million. The Hague was 
therefore offering 'equality' to a population many times bigger than its own. At the 
same time Suriname had only 140000 inhabitants and the Dutch Antilles 108000. In 
the negotiating process leading to the Charter, West Indian politicians capitalized on 
the accommodations which The Hague had originally created specifically for the East 
Indies. Hence the fictitious 'equality' between two Caribbean nations and their 
metropolis, which, in reality, dwarfs them. 
The Statuut has been the foundation of the transatlantic Kingdom for half a 
century. In the preamble it was stated that the Charter would not be an 'eternal pact'. 
In reality it seems to have been just that: a virtually unchangeable arrangement. 
Certainly its membership has changed, with Suriname attaining independence in 
1975; Aruba seceding from the Netherlands Antilles and acquiring a separate status 
as a territory within the Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1986; and yet more changes 
in store. But the contents of the Charter have been preserved to the letter, just as they 
were in 1954. Unfortunately this absence of change can be attributed not to the 
constitution's luminosity but rather to its rigidity. As the Charter itself posits, no 
change whatsoever can be implemented unless all partners agree. 
THE DUTCH PREFERENCE FOR A FULL RETREAT 
Until the late 1960s all three countries of the Kingdom were by and large satisfied 
with the Statuut. For The Hague the turning point came in May 1969 with the revolt 
of Cura~ao. A labour conflict with strong political and racial connotations ended with 
rioters burning down central parts of the capital, Willemstad. According to the 
Charter, the government of the Antilles had the right to ask for military help from the 
Dutch government, and the latter had to abide by that request. Within hours Dutch 
marines were patrolling the smouldering streets of Willemstad. This intervention 
sparked a new and unenthusiastic awareness in the Netherlands of its remnants of 
empire. The Hague now moved to the position that its relationship with the 
Caribbean parts of the Kingdom did not contain significant positive interests and 
implied many uncalled-for risks. 
There are three main considerations behind this reluctance, which has since been 
characteristic of the Dutch attitude. Initially the most important concern was the 
awareness that the Charter, while entrusting the responsibility for guaranteeing good 
governance in the overseas territories to the Kingdom government, at the same time 
leaves this government little opportunity for preventive action in view of the domestic 
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autonomy awarded in the same document. So, from a Dutch perspective, The Hague 
had little to do with the origins of the local discontent which sparked the 1969 riots, 
yet was obliged to intervene and ended up being unduly criticized for neocolonial 
behaviour. Dutch policy therefore needed to disentangle itself from similar future 
obligations by either simply terminating the postcolonial relationship, or conversely 
becoming ever more interventionist in order to prevent new potential embarrassments 
from developing. The first line was dominant until roughly 1990, the second ever 
since. 
The second consideration lies in the economic realm. The expectation expressed in 
the Charter that mutual assistance would help narrow the gap in standards of living 
between the various parts of the Kingdom proved to be an illusion. Admittedly, the 
relatively generous Dutch development aid has helped Aruba to attain economic 
stability and hence its present very high per capita income. In contrast, neither pre-
independence Suriname nor the contemporary Antilles has been successful in bridging 
the gap with the ever-richer metropolis. Today Dutch politicians complain of 
Antillean 'aid addiction' and claim that no country in the world receives as much per 
capita aid as the Netherlands Antilles. These are false exaggerations, and certainly the 
assistance extended to the islands is of no serious significance to the Dutch Treasury 
(Oostindie and Klinkers, 2003, pp. 222-223). Development aid is extended along 
with continuous reminders of the need for 'self-reliance'. Meanwhile, the reality is 
that Caribbean reliance on Dutch economic support has simply increased. 
Over time, a third, mainly domestic, concern has gained ever more significance for 
Dutch politicians: unease with the unrestricted migration channel from the Dutch 
Caribbean to the metropolis. By the early 1970s some 40 000 people from the Antilles 
and Suriname had settled in the Netherlands. Today there are over 320000 Dutch 
with Surinamese backgrounds and another 130000 with Antillean or Aruban roots. 
The influx of migrants from Suriname has levelled out after open access was curtailed 
with independence. Antilleans and Arubans, however, enjoy Dutch nationality and 
have the right to settle in the Netherlands. As lower-class juvenile migration from 
Curas;ao has created public order problems in Dutch towns over the past decade, this 
open channel has come under serious attack in Dutch politics. (There is a political 
divide over the question of whether free access of Antilleans and Arubans should be 
curtailed as such. A centre-right majority in parliament has urged the centre-right 
cabinet to devise such draconian legislation. This project led to draft legislation in 
2005 but is likely to fail because of both juridical and pragmatic obstacles. 
Meanwhile, the whole spectrum of Dutch political parties, from the far right to the 
left, now favours tight controls on deviant Antillean youths. There is widespread 
support for unconventional policies. Thus in January 2006 the municipality of 
Rotterdam, claiming that young Curas;aoans are the most criminal group in the 
country's second city, presented a new project which will oblige young Antilleans to 
be either pursuing their education, in a job or in some sort of judicial trajectory.) 
THE INDEPENDENCE OF SURINAME (1975) 
With few overall benefits, little positive engagement, limited administrative powers 
yet many responsibilities, it is no wonder that the Netherlands has attempted since 
1970 to disentangle itself from its Caribbean dependencies. There are decisive legal 
128 G. Oostindie 
complications, however, since dismantling the Kingdom would imply changing the 
Statuut. To accomplish this, all partners involved would need to agree. This has 
proved to be highly problematic. The Dutch managed to strike a deal on this with 
Suriname, but failed to do so with the islands. 
Suriname became independent in 1975 in a highly unusual and fast-track political 
process which defied all claims of the Kingdom government as a patron of good 
governance. Certainly there was a nationalist, pro-independence movement in the 
country, mainly catering to the Afro-Surinamese in a society deeply divided along 
ethnic lines. The mainly Afro-Suriname government headed by Prime Minister Henck 
Arron would celebrate the transfer of sovereignty as if it had been a hard-won victory, 
which it certainly was not. 
The dominant sentiment in The Hague was no less anti-colonial, albeit especially 
with an eye for the Dutch image, and a Dutch weighing up of costs and benefits. This 
was really modern paternalism dressed up as progressive policy. The centre-left 
cabinet of JooP den Uyl managed to accomplish the transfer of sovereignty in just 
20 months. The population of Suriname was never directly invited to offer its opinion 
on the transfer of sovereignty. Neither of the two governments had any interest in 
staging a referendum: both sides assumed, probably quite correctly, that a majority 
would oppose independence. 
During these 20 months of negotiations, the mainly Hindustani opposition had 
little faith in either the process or its outcome. Meanwhile, the two governments 
watched helplessly as one-third of the population of Suriname voted with their feet, 
choosing to live in the cold European motherland rather than staying in the new 
republic. In the end the transfer of sovereignty was only achieved because at the 
critical moment in the parliament of Suriname there was a majority of just one vote in 
favour of independence. The Dutch parliament agreed wholeheartedly with this 
wafer-thin majority, while the Antillean assembly did not object as long as there were 
no implications for its own non-sovereign status. 
In the three decades that have passed since the transfer of sovereignty, the hoped-
for 'model decolonization' has proved to be a disappointment. Suriname received a 
relatively generous dowry of 3.5 billion Dutch guilders or about 10000 guilders per 
capita (around €10 000 per capita at current rates). The continuation of development 
aid was pledged. Yet this largesse did not prevent economic decline: many politicians 
feel that it undermined the economy, and some economists lend credence to this (e.g. 
van Dijck, 2001). Current per capita income in Suriname is among the lowest in the 
Caribbean. Moreover, even if the dowry to Suriname has been much criticized as 
extravagant, since 1975 the Netherlands has spent twice as much on the six Antillean 
islands taken together, and per capita three times as much on the islands' population, 
as on the poorer Surinamese (Oostindie and Klinkers, 2003, p. 165). 
This is not all. The demographic growth of the Surinamese population has been 
heavily concentrated in the Netherlands. The political and administrative history of 
the republic has had many low points, of which the military dictatorship of the 1980s 
was the nadir. Informal and illegal sectors have become pervasive in the economy and 
society, a development that successive governments have been either unwilling or 
unable to redress. Many observers already qualify Suriname as a failing state. It is 
indeed questionable whether, in the long run, Suriname will be able to survive as an 
independent state. The Netherlands, still the most important partner, is slowly 
disengaging itself. Suriname has been trying to strengthen its engagement with the 
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Caribbean Community and Common Market (Caricom) countries. But in the long 
run Brazil, which considers the Guyanas as its backyard, or even Venezuela, may well 
fill the void left by the Netherlands - possibly via informal dominion, or more likely 
through settlement and land clearances. 
THE NETHERLANDS ANTILLES: DISINTEGRA nON WITHOUT 
SOVEREIGNTY 
In contrast to Suriname, the Antilles has never had a serious pro-independence 
movement. Over the past decades some political parties have rendered lip service to a 
parting with the Netherlands in a distant future, but in practice Antillean politicians 
have simply refused to discuss sovereignty. Much to the annoyance of their Dutch 
counterparts, they have consistently brushed aside threats that independence would 
be imposed upon them. After all, they maintain, the Statuut guaranteed that any 
change was contingent upon their cooperation; and no consensus on the subject of a 
transfer of sovereignty would be forthcoming from the islands. The predicament of 
the Republic of Suriname has only added to Antillean reluctance - and in the end 
induced the Dutch to rethink their stance. 
Around 1990 The Hague finally concluded that it would be practically impossible 
as well as immoral and reproachable by international standards unilaterally to 
enforce independence upon its remnants of empire in the Caribbean. With this 
understanding the playing field changed yet again. The debate has since revolved 
around the question of the boundaries between Caribbean autonomy and the 
prerogative of the Kingdom - for all practical purposes, this meaning the Netherlands 
- to playa more active role in Caribbean administration. This is simply a means to a 
further end in the Dutch view. The Hague's perception is that the overseas 
governments have too often been incapable or even unwilling to meet international 
standards of good governance. There is uneasiness about fragile governments, about 
clear signs of corruption, about the threat of bankruptcy of the Antillean government. 
As The Hague thus had to accept the impossibility of a full retreat from the region, 
the Dutch in the end also conceded to another unsolicited development, namely the 
internal disintegration of the six-island Netherlands Antilles. In 1986 Aruba received 
its much desired status aparte, a secession from the Dutch Antilles subject to the 
condition that the island would have to attain full independence 10 years later. The 
Netherlands had insisted on this condition, both in the vain hope of breaking the 
Aruban struggle for a status aparte and to keep the other islands from a similar 
separatism, which would most probably imply the end of the multi-island Antilles. 
The Hague at the time still hoped for a transfer of sovereignty to a six-island state of 
the Antilles. What really followed was predictable. As of 1 January 1986 
Aruba started an all-out offensive in order to remove the fatal date of independence 
from the Statuut. It succeeded in 1996 with the attainment of a permanent separate 
status within the Kingdom. Henceforward the Charter once again binds three 
countries. 
Much to The Hague's frustration, both the Antillean and the Aruban governments 
have been wary of complying with the pressure to trade in local autonomy in favour 
of a strengthening of governmental institutions at the level of the Kingdom. At the 
same time the Caribbean governments have relied heavily on Dutch support in 
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helping them to resolve local problems. In the Aruban case this has worked 
reasonably well- actually, because of its vigorous liberal economic policy, the island 
has time and again been promoted as a shining example to the protectionist Antillean 
government. Over the past decade Willemstad has started to liberalize its economy as 
well, but a deep crisis remains. National debt by now is almost equal to GDP, 
unemployment in the formal sector is sky-high and, in spite of the overall, relatively 
high per capita income, there is outright deprivation in many parts of the Antilles. 
Successive Antillean governments have blamed part of their problems on the 
complicated structure of the Antilles-of-five, a colonial construct which in practice is 
characterized more by island-centred visions, mutual distrust and chicaneries than by 
a genuine sense of belonging together. In the early 1990s the Dutch proposed a trade-
off between the islands' preference for breaking up the federal Antilles against their 
own wish to secure a firmer grip on local governments. This Dutch policy rested on 
the unwillingness of local politicians to give up autonomy and led to what probably -
in reaction - was a resurgence of pan-Antillean solidarity. 
Debate over the Statuut has been revived since the year 2000. Large majorities of 
both political parties on the five islands and their electorates, who were given a 
chance to speak out in a national plebiscite, now opt for an end to the five-island state 
and want direct relations of each of the islands with the Netherlands. The forms these 
direct relations may take are multiple. One option is full integration of an individual 
island or of a combination of these into the Netherlands, as in a departmental or 
municipal status. Another option is for individual islands to acquire the status aparte 
Aruba already secured for itself in 1986, that is, the status of an autonomous country 
within the Kingdom of the Netherlands originally reserved for the six-island 
Netherlands Antilles only. The option of a continuation of a multi-island Netherlands 
Antilles is no longer feasible. And, to complete the picture, the option of a collective 
or insular choice for independence is still one without significant support (see 
Table 9.1). 
Table 9.1 Results of plebiscites in the Netherlands Antilles, 2000 - 05 (%) 
Turnout 
Bonaire 56.1 
Curac;ao 54.0 
Saba 78.0 
St Eustatius 55.0 
St Martin 55.7 
Source: www.minbzk.nl 
Note 
Status quo 
(Antilles-
of-five) 
15.9 
3.7 
13.0 
77.0 
3.7 
Unilateral Full Autonomous 
link with integration country 
the into the within the 
Netherlands Netherlands Kingdom 
59.5 n.a. 24.1 
n.a. 23.6 67.3 
86.0 n.a. n.a. 
21.0 2.0 n.a. 
n.a. 11.6 69.9 
Independence 
0.5 
4.8 
1.0 
0.6 
14.2 
The plebiscites were held on: 23 June 2000 (St Martin), 10 September 2004 (Bonaire), 5 November 2004 
(Saba) and 8 April 2005 (Cura<;;ao and St Eustatius). The available options were not identical, hence the 
blanks (n.a.) in the table. Full integration into the Netherlands was understood as some sort of special 
municipality status within the Dutch administrative apparatus. The option of a unilateral link presupposes 
slightly more insular autonomy, but always clearly short of the high level of autonomy presently applicable 
to both Aruba and the Netherlands Antilles. 
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On closer inspection the outcomes disclose some interesting contrasts. As expected, 
the drive for a status aparte within the Kingdom dominates in the two largest entities: 
Cura<;ao (with some 130000 inhabitants) and (the Dutch part of) St Martin (nearly 
40000). Nominal support in these parts for full sovereignty has increased since the 
1990s, but still represents a minority view only. In Bonaire (10000), support for a 
country status within the Kingdom has more support now than before but, consistent 
with previous polls, a clear majority favours a direct link with the Netherlands. On 
Saba, with its 1400 inhabitants, an even more outspoken majority opts for this 
outcome. Surprisingly perhaps, the third Windward island of St Eustatius (2300 
people) still harbours a clear majority for a continuation of the five-island Antilles. 
The only alternative option attracting significant support is, again, a unilateral link 
with the Netherlands. 
The overall conclusion must be that the vast majority of the Antillean electorate 
have no confidence left in the five-island nation. In this they concur with their political 
leaders. Interestingly, they were not of the same opinion in 1993-94, when clear 
majorities in all islands still voted in favour of a continuation of the Antilles-of-five, 
even if the great majority of Antillean politicians advised them otherwise (Oostindie 
and Verton, 1998, p. 49). Then the proportion in favour of a continuation of the 
Antilles-of-five was over 85% for the three smallest islands, 73.6% for Cura<;ao and 
59.4% for St Martin, while the independence option was chosen by less than 1 % on 
all islands, except for St Martin (6.3%). 
Why did patience with the federally structured Antilles wane? One reason 
advanced by many observers may have been that, in 1993-94, the electorate was 
largely expressing its lack of confidence in local leadership. Even so, while the 
character and quality of this leadership has not changed significantly over the past 
decade, Antilleans do feel today that each should go its separate way. 
Basically this all started with St Martin, always the least enthusiastic partner in the 
Antilles-of-five. Once the St Martiners had in 2000 voted squarely in favour of 
separation, the rest simply followed, with only St Eustatius ('Statia') in vain opting 
against change. It should be noted that the argument in favour of a break-up centres 
on bureaucratic and political issues. All islands complain of the dominance of 
Cura<;ao, while Cura<;ao in turn feels the federation to be burdensome to its own 
development. Apparently the question of whether the colonial construct of a 
five-island nation over the centuries has really become a nation, or should work 
towards this, is no longer deemed relevant. This was very different after 1993-
94, when the Antillean government made some efforts to restructure the five-
island state and advocated concomitant nation building (Commissie Natievorming, 
1996). 
The Dutch have never been enthusiastic about the prospect of having to entertain 
separate relations with six small to absolutely tiny islands and only reluctantly agreed 
to the separation of Aruba first, and the further demise of the Antilles next. They have 
done so because they feel there is no willingness whatsoever left among the five 
islands to work together and that, moreover, inter-insular strife further diminishes the 
quality of Antillean governance. The Hague once again expects a trade-off now, in the 
form of a strengthening of the Kingdom's institutions within Caribbean government-
for most practical purposes, this will mean more Dutch control, perhaps mitigated by 
partial repairs of the 'democratic deficit'. Whether this can be accomplished within 
the parameters of the present Statuut is still a matter of debate. A promising 2004 
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bilateral position paper on the subject suggests it can. But its lukewarm reception on 
the islands does not inspire much confidence (Werkgroep Bestuurlijke en Financiele 
Verhoudingen, 2004). Unfortunately, Aruba was not invited to participate in this 
commission, and therefore may have felt little obligation to contribute to its 
realization. 
Arduous negotiations in 2005 led to a provisional agreement, which the islands 
hope will materialize in a permanent new status by mid-2007 (Hoofdlijnenakkoord, 
2005). In the agreement The Hague only states that it is aware of the desire of 
Cura~ao and St Martin to attain country status by 1 July 2007. The programme 
now is for both Cura~ao and St Martin to attain autonomous country status within 
the Kingdom, while the small three will entertain direct relations with the 
Netherlands - Statia has explicitly agreed to what it now feels is inevitable, the full 
disintegration of the Antilles-of-five. Yet there is no clear conception as yet of what 
this arrangement would be like in practice. Cura~ao and St Martin opt for a status 
equal to autonomous Aruba, but The Hague has strongly argued that autonomy 
needs to be limited in favour of more prerogatives to the Kingdom in the first place. 
The smaller islands could be some sort of municipalities within the Kingdom; but 
can there be municipalities without a provincial layer of government? To 
complicate matters, The Hague insists that any arrangement for a break-up of 
the five-island country should include a restructuring of the national debt, which 
now stands at a staggering 96% of Antillean annual GNP. And, finally, we have 
Aruba, distrustful of any change that might affect its own best-of-all-possible-
worlds status, and which has the right to veto any changes to the Charter it feels 
them to be unfair or unwise. 
THE ANTILLEAN PREDICAMENT 
While the text of the Statuut has remained cast in stone for 50 years, contextual 
changes have been afoot. The major change is demographic. The numerical imbalance 
between the population of the Netherlands (now 16 million) and the six islands 
(180000 in the Antilles and 90 000 in Aruba) has become even more pronounced. 
Moreover, with some 130 000 islanders having settled in the metropolis in the past 
two decades, the Antillean and Aruban population is now fully transatlantic. This has 
consequences for the islands and the migrants themselves, consequences that local 
politicians tend to ignore. What once were only Caribbean questions and problems -
such as local unemployment, local criminality, local poverty - are now also Dutch 
problems. 
The second changed parameter is the institutional setting. In 1954 the legislator 
spoke of self-governing partners under the umbrella of one Kingdom. Since then the 
small Caribbean partners have tenaciously hung on to their autonomy, while the 
largest partner has transferred a major part of its sovereignty to the European Union 
(EU). The progressive Dutch incorporation into the EU now obliges the islands to 
consider what further consequences they must draw from their refusal to opt for 
independence. In local debates on this question - such as on the possible choice for the 
status of an ultra-peripheral territory of the EU - one observes an anachronistic 
obsession with autonomy and an unwillingness to face up to the new geopolitical 
realities among most local politicians. This attitude seems self-defeating as well as 
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risky. As observers in Brussels often remark, the more the EU spreads eastward, the 
more Brussels' willingness to accommodate the former West European colonies is 
likely to come under scrutiny. 
Yet, in spite of the evident asymmetry of demographic, economic and geopolitical 
realities, the words of the original Statuut persist. The Caribbean partners continue to 
exercise the right to veto any changes proposed by the Dutch that they do not 
consider to be in their best interests. This deadlock may not continue indefinitely, 
however. The Hague is becoming weary of the many problems and few successes of 
its Caribbean policies, which in the Dutch press and in political circles alike are 
routinely characterized as an arduous 'muddling through'. The Dutch electorate too 
has become more aware of the Kingdom's bonds, and evaluates these mainly in 
negative terms. There is little sense of solidarity: clear and consistent majorities of the 
Dutch would prefer the islands to become independent today rather than tomorrow 
(Oostindie and Klinkers, 2001, Vol. II, pp. 38-39, 73-75; Vol. III, pp. 67-69, 
231-232). In fact, one may well conclude that over the past half century Dutch 
politicians have been more accommodating of the islands than their own electorate 
would have liked. The recent attempts to curtail free immigration from the Antilles 
are a remarkable exception to this rule. Domestic problems connected with the lower-
class Curac;aoan exodus to the Netherlands have only compounded this negative 
attitude. 
Across the Atlantic the Antillean people and their political elites, aware of the 
Suriname experience, of the growing US influence in the region, and of the onset of a 
global climate more disposed towards 'free trade', do not want to lose their umbilical 
cord to the Netherlands. As was confirmed once more in the recent plebiscites, 
support for political independence is negligible on all islands except, to some degree, 
St Martin. Antilleans and Arubans fear the loss of their privileged position if they 
should agree to even the smallest of changes to the Statuut, let alone to a transfer of 
sovereignty. Yet their facing up to a common (former) colonizer does not imply 
mutual solidarity. In their encounters with The Hague Antillean politicians may 
readily emphasize the communality of their Antillean and wider Caribbean culture, 
but in their political behaviour, insularity rules. 
While politicians on both sides of the ocean continue negotiations over the 
dismantling of the Netherlands Antilles and the formulation of a new balance 
between Kingdom institutions and Caribbean autonomy, a political backlash in the 
Netherlands is evident. The May 2005 Dutch decision to prepare legislation to restrict 
migration from the Caribbean territories to the metropolis is illustrative. Admittedly 
these restrictions, once legislated, would only apply to specific problematic groups of 
immigrants. Even so, and on very good grounds, Antilleans and Arubans, who value 
the right of abode in the Netherlands as one of the principal arguments for their 
adherence to the Kingdom, perceive this new policy as a slap in the face. As it is, both 
judicial and pragmatic objections may well prevent this intended policy from 
materializing (Oostindie and Klinkers, 2003, p. 196). It is ironic that the UK has 
moved in exactly the opposite direction. 
Perhaps some Dutch politicians naively hope that the offence will provoke 
Antilleans to reconsider membership in the Kingdom. More probably the assertive 
Dutch policy on the migration issue will only poison the climate in which the delicate 
issue of a rearrangement of autonomies and overarching responsibilities within the 
Kingdom is discussed. The outcome of this new round of skirmishes is not yet clear. 
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Certainly the unilateral Dutch interventions have aroused animosity and provoked 
much anti-colonial rhetoric. The 'recolonization' concept has become an accusatory 
buzzword over the past decade. Antillean politicians are renowned for standing up 
vocally to The Hague and they may benefit from this, further complicating the 
arduous negotiations on a reform of the Kingdom and a planned break-up of the 
Antilles. But there is no indication whatsoever that this will translate into any 
significant support for a pro-independence nationalism. 
So what may be expected? Independence is not on the agenda. Direct political 
subordination of the Caribbean islands (as in counties, municipalities or provinces) is 
a problematic option. Both Cura~ao and St Martin are reluctant to let go of the 
present autonomy accorded to the Antilles-of-five. They prefer to inherit the same 
freedoms and competences Aruba did in 1986. Conversely The Hague is not really 
interested in transforming the Caribbean territories into fully integrated parts of the 
Kingdom. Dutch politicians are reluctant to return to the driver's seat after half a 
century of Caribbean autonomy. Moreover, they do not like the idea of possibly 
having to finance - as France does - a European lifestyle in the Caribbean. 
Most probably The Hague will continue its policy of strengthening the institutions 
of the Kingdom and will in turn cooperate with the dismantling of the Netherlands 
Antilles as a single entity, a process that presupposes a modicum of mutual trust and 
pragmatism. From Dutch Caribbean politicians it requires the courage critically to 
assess what degree of autonomy really serves their islands' citizenry best. This is not 
necessarily the same degree of autonomy that matches their own personal interests 
and political convictions. Dutch politicians in turn may be expected to refrain from 
offering illusions to their own electorate wary of the Antilles in the first place. Thus, 
they will have to spell out that an eventual farewell to the Antilles is highly unlikely, 
that growth rather than a decrease in financial support is necessary, and that 
migration from the Dutch Caribbean will continue and should be accepted. This too 
requires a measure of courage. 
Whatever the eventual political arrangements, the six islands will most probably 
experience a strengthening rather than a loosening of their transatlantic ties. While 
many Antilleans worry about the growing tendency for Dutch involvement as some 
kind of recolonization, the lack of any serious alternative to the present status 
precludes radical nationalist alternatives. This predicament translates into at times 
heated affirmations of insular patriotism which only underline the obvious paradox: 
much against their will, Antilleans today are more dependent upon the Dutch 
connection then ever before, a subordination only strengthened by their own choice 
of political insularism (Oostindie, 2005). 
WIDER IMPLICATIONS FOR SUB-NATIONAL ISLAND JURISDICTIONS 
Two broad concerns underlie this paper. The first, no longer controversial, is that 
there are a good many reasons why small, postcolonial territories may be wise not to 
opt for independence but instead to remain part of a larger state entity. For various 
reasons also the former metropolis may be expected to accept this decision to retain 
close ties. The second question is what degree of autonomy best serves the interests of 
these small, mainly island entities, non-sovereign 'jurisdictions' which, as Baldacchino 
(2006) argues, occupy the fuzzy middle ground between sovereignty and munici-
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pality. This second question, which incidentally refers not only to postcolonial 
territories, is both more complicated and more controversial than the first. 
One refreshing and optimistic assessment of the advantages of maximum autonomy 
for such territories is Baldacchino's. He suggests that their status will stimulate 
flexibility among all parties involved. The metropolitan power - whether the UK, 
France, the USA or the Netherlands - offers an indispensable safety net and can 
exercise some form of 'soft imperialism'. But the Sub-National Island Jurisdiction 
(SNI]) has "enough discretion to safeguard national identity, local culture and the 
general exercise of local power". For these SNIJs this apparent limbo is seen by 
Baldacchino (2004, pp. 77, 84; see also Baldacchino, 2006) as "a winning strategy in 
political economy". He therefore predicts that the next few decades will not witness 
"a flurry of independentist movements, but [rather] attempts by sub-national 
jurisdictions to carve out policy discretion on a specific number of areas in their 
favour". 
My analysis of the Dutch Caribbean case supports this prognosis, but arrives at 
more ambivalent and indeed slightly more pessimistic conclusions. The major 
empirical evidence in favour of the 'winning strategy' argument is the dazzling 
economic development of Aruba after its separashon from the other Antilles. There is 
no doubt whatsoever that the new status at once greatly enhanced the island's 
flexibility and governmental efficiency and boosted local culture and identity. Aruba 
became a shining example both to Curac;ao and to St Martin of what is possible with 
greater autonomy. 
In contrast, there have been disturbing developments in the quality of governance 
itself on the islands, something that has clearly demonstrated the limitations of 
autonomous rule. Why is this? The central Antillean government's apparent 
unwillingness, or incapability, to redress corrupt governance on St Martin in the 
1980s and early 1990s is one example. Similar problems emerged in Aruba in the 
1990s, and they continue with the present dramatic debt crisis of the Netherlands 
Antilles (Oostindie and Klinkers, 2003, pp. 131-152). In these and other cases, The 
Hague saw itself as obliged to interfere - not from any nostalgic urge to 'recolonize' 
the Dutch Caribbean, far from it. Since local politicians have failed to live up to 
acceptable standards of good governance, the Dutch drive to strengthen the 
prerogatives of the Kingdom, and hence their own involvement, was less a matter 
of virtue or desire than of a sense of duty and necessity. 
It seems to me that there are many parallels here with the British policy for its 
overseas territories as executed over the past decades. One is that the same regional 
and insular problems have demanded a stepping-up of metropolitan intervention 
quite in contrast to the earlier policy of retreat. Another is that this new policy may be 
welcomed on the islands on pragmatic grounds, but at the same time arouses much 
local concern over autonomy and identity issues. This postcolonial predicament is 
hard to solve and will undoubtedly continue to arouse much controversy - as it does 
in the American and French dependent territories in the Caribbean (Hintjens, 2004; 
Ramos and Rivera, 2001). 
One final observation seems in order here. Perhaps other small, non-sovereign 
territories have fared better than the Antilles. Perhaps, indeed, other such entities do 
not suffer to the same degree from the vulnerabilities which seem to characterize the 
Dutch Caribbean. Their small scale - extreme in the case of these six island 
jurisdictions - has aggravated a specific clientelist political tradition resulting in 
136 G. Oostindie 
deficiencies in the quality of local governance. The freedom of movement inherent in 
the postcolonial relationship is adding to this through the brain drain towards the 
metropolis. In addition, and this is sheer bad luck, the geographical location of the 
islands in a zone of narco-trafficking places them, literally and metaphorically, in 
between the centres of drug production and drug consumption. The problem is that 
the islands' internal capacity to counter the corrupting influence of the drugs business 
and its associated money laundering is very limited. 
This is indeed one of the main arguments in favour of strengthening postcolonial 
constitutional arrangements. It is also a major argument for stepping up the level of 
intra-regional cooperation, both within the group of sub-national island jurisdictions 
and between this group and the independent states of the Caribbean. While history 
teaches us that genuine cooperation within this highly fragmented region is hard to 
accomplish, we might expect metropolitan institutions to give a positive impetus in 
this respect. 
While the fight against narco-trafficking comes to mind here first, we may also 
think of the development of legitimate economic opportunities, such as economically 
sustainable tourism. As it is, tourism has become the most important legal sector in 
most Caribbean economies, thriving without subsidies or special protective measures. 
Yet the ecological effects of mass tourism threaten to ruin the very assets on which it 
is premised. This affects both the independent Caribbean and its sub-national island 
jurisdictions. 
In conclusion then, yes, there are very good reasons to celebrate the opportunities 
enjoyed by sub-national island jurisdictions because of their intermediate status. But 
these obvious benefits should not keep us from critically assessing the risks that can 
arise from granting too much autonomy to territories that may be too limited in 
human resources and governmental capacities to handle such autonomy, or to cope 
with its risks. Tailor-made solutions will be needed for these jurisdictions. Blessed 
with the option of not having to struggle on their own, these unique entities are 
unlikely to find general models to fit them or show them the directions in which they 
should go. 
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Note 
1. The Caribbean is generally defined as all islands in the Caribbean Sea, plus the Guyanas and 
Belize. The three Guyanas, while located on the northern shores of South America, have 
traditionally been inhabited and developed mainly along the Atlantic seashore, looking 
outward across the ocean to Europe and subsequently the Caribbean and the USA rather 
than 'down' to mainland South America. For centuries these coastal zones were therefore 
virtual islands, isolated from their South American neighbours. Of course, the informal 
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regional expansion of Brazil and perhaps Venezuela may change this 'island status' over 
time. In fact, Belize, formerly British Honduras, initially shared much of this 'island 
orientation' across the Atlantic towards its colonial metropolis with the Guyanas. Over the 
past decades, however, both migration and political pressure from the surrounding Central 
American republics have broken this isolation, with mixed results for the local Anglophone 
population. This history may well repeat itself in the sovereign Guyanas. 
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